Economic benefits for Bulgaria from joining NATO by -
THE EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION OF BULGARIA
IN COOPERATION WITH
THE CENTRE FOR LIBERAL STRATEGIES
ECONOMIC BENEFITS
FOR BULGARIA
FROM JOINING NATO
05.10.2001
SOFIA
2Dear reader,
Since the idea of Bulgaria joining NATO was launched in public space, the debate has
targeted predominantly the political and the military-technical aspects of the issue. The
Employers Association of Bulgaria does not underestimate the importance of these factors
nonetheless, as a representative of the big domestic private capital, we believe that it is
about time to seriously and extensively research and analyze the economic and social
aspects of a future membership of Bulgaria in NATO.
Political acts that wouldn’t have economic consequences simply do not exist, as
momentous economic acts have their ramifications in the political course of the country.
Obviously, the behavior of the private capital is a barometer for any of the changes. Hence
it is unquestionably of the interest of the Employers Association of Bulgaria to avail itself
of a strategic analysis of the economic and social development of this country in the
circumstances of NATO membership. We took the initiative to perform such a research in
cooperation with the Centre for Liberal Strategies, a leading Bulgarian think tank.
We understand that this paper, being the first of its kind, marks the beginning of a process
which will continue at least until Bulgaria is officially invited to join NATO. Therefore we
would be grateful for your opinion, comments and recommendations.
Vassil Vassilev
Chairman of the Board
Employers Association of Bulgaria
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5INTRODUCTION
A. The new context
Until 11 September 2001 the situation in the world was seen predominantly in the context
of the end of the Cold War in 1989. September the 11th marks the beginning of a new
situation. The new type of terrorism will have a global effect both on the security and
economic environments in the foreseeable future. The instant changes forced upon us by
that single event have been changes of perception; it will take some time before they
become operationalized as changes of project. The following is a summary of what appear
at this point to be the most probable lines of change.
Redefining security
Defending a group of people (e.g. a nation) by defending a specific territory (e.g. a state) no
longer looks viable. Lethal attacks on individuals originating from inside the country are no
longer limited to attempts made on an individual basis. Attacks are accomplished on a mass
scale. Therefore a traditional police force can no longer provide effective defense against
them. On the other hand, a traditional army has neither the training nor the mandate to
operate within the country. So far it has been used so only in exceptional situations of
emergency. However, what we are faced with here is a long-term challenge; coming to grips
with it might take decades. We can at this stage conclude the following:
The terrorist attacks have resulted in a situation of quasi-total insecurity. On the basis of
this new perception the new security goal will be gradually formulated. Most probably, the
new goal will not be to restore the status quo, i.e. a perception of “quasi-total security”: that
seems unrealistic. The most that could be aimed at is a new level of “limited security
6Instruments of the new limited security
Their main characteristics would have to be the following.
(a) They should include a transnational armed force.
(b) They should combine the functions of today’s army, police and intelligence
institutions.
Control over such new instruments
Probably the most important reason for not creating such security instruments until now has
been the understanding that currently there are no mechanisms for democratic control over
them. However, the control dilemma has been reformulated. It is no longer “to have it or
not to have it”; it is “to have it without a democratic control mechanism – or with one”.
Difficulties notwithstanding, such a control mechanism should be engineered. The risk of
abuse would not stop us to build the instrument itself; it should not therefore stop us from
building its control mechanism.
The economic context
In the new situation economic performance develops a much stronger link to security
(security as redefined here). In a sense, economic performance would become a direct
function of security. Most business minds have always known that (a) getting killed is the
ultimate bankruptcy and, (b) building a new security instrument is profitable. In world
history, it appears, that has never been so true as today. The strongest and best part of world
business would beyond any doubt be lobbying for a new security system of the type
outlined above, and would be ready to pay and profit from its implementation. A long
intermediary period is to be expected here before the first version of such a system is
installed. It is contended here that this intermediary period has already begun.
7B. The case for Bulgaria
1. Security in Bulgaria
In their modern history Bulgarians have never experienced a sense of security comparable
to citizens of the US or developed democracies in Western Europe. In the new context this
could turn out to be an advantage: accommodation to the realities of limited security would
be easier. As to the price that would have to be paid, the situation is more complex. In
economic terms the price will not exceed much the price that would have to be paid for
joining NATO – for the reason that the country simply does not physically possess more
resources. It is encouraging that there is a broad consensus that such a price would have to
be paid, so the process would be relatively smooth. It is different with the political price.
Bulgarians value dearly their freedoms and liberties acquired with democracy. It would take
a serious effort on the part of the local elite and the international community to convince the
public that certain personal freedoms and liberties should be curtailed for the global good.
The most important point to be understood and widely accepted here is that joining NATO
both as a process and as an achievement is good for Bulgarian economy; and that a better
Bulgarian economy is good for Bulgarian, Balkan and global security.
2. Joining NATO: a better Bulgarian economy
The fact that Bulgarians experienced less security than NATO member countries was the
main reason for their decision to join NATO in the first place. In the new context this is
also a positive point, for the country has already opted for better security through collective
security.
While security concerns have preceded, from the beginning of this process the economic
implications were clearly seen and calculated. There are two main types of economic effects
for Bulgaria stemming from its eventual membership in NATO. The first type includes
mainly tangible results, to be elaborated upon shortly. The second type, which is arguably
much more important for the long run development of the country, consists of the intangible
8improvements in the Bulgarian climate and statehood associated with the characteristics a
country needs to possess to be accepted as a NATO member.
The tangible economic benefits from NATO membership for Bulgaria are easy to describe
and discuss in general, but quite difficult to quantify. The most direct and easily measurable
economic cons of joining NATO for Bulgaria will be the changes in the defense budget and
in its composition. Figure 1 shows the projections (based on the assumption of
approximately 7 % growth in nominal GDP over the period 2002-2007) for the growth of
defense investment both as a sum in million leva, and as a percent of Bulgarian GDP.
        Figure 1. Defense investment in Bulgaria 2001-2007
Under the present economic conditions of relatively suppressed aggregate demand, and
inasmuch as at least some portion of this investment will be supported by the NATO allies
(under the Security Investment Program and other programs for support of less developed
member states), this increased spending in itself will provide a boost to GDP growth. The
value of this boost depends on the expenditure multiplier, which is not estimated for
Bulgaria yet. However, under realistic assumptions, an increase in defense investment by
about 0.1 percentage points of GDP per year may contribute up to 0.15 to 0.2 percentage
points of GDP to economic growth. A further effect of such a development will be the
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9improved prospects facing the Bulgarian defense industry complex. The many different
enterprises servicing the defense sector in the country will become significantly more
attractive as investment opportunities and expected rates of return. This will enable them to
attract foreign investors, and will also put them in better medium and long term competitive
positions internationally than they have now.
Besides increased defense investment, NATO membership will mean for Bulgaria an
improvement of the dynamic of industries related to defense, and to other infrastructure
expenditures. The national security system is closely linked with much of the country’s civil
infrastructure, such as roads, railroads, communications, energy grids. If Bulgaria is to
become a member of NATO, it will accept the necessity to improve this infrastructure even
beyond the requirements for EU membership and in shorter period of time. The needs in
terms of percent of GDP for the achievement of this goal are difficult to asses, but the
NATO-related increment in these investments may be comparable to the purely defense
investment, thus very roughly doubling the effect of NATO membership on Bulgarian GDP
growth to between 0.3 and 0.4 percentage points.
In addition to public and infrastructure expenditures, the eventual membership of Bulgaria
in NATO will have relevance for related industries, which include various branches of the
Bulgarian economy. The information industry will be affected by the software needs and the
changes in telecommunications. The tourist industry will be boosted by the improved
security and by the improvements in road and communication infrastructure and will
brighten the prospects of sustaining its ability to attract more and more Western tourists to
Bulgaria and to expand the range of tourist services offered. The education sector will face
new opportunities related to the specific knowledge, training and research needs caused by
the membership of Bulgaria in the most modern defense system in the world. The ecology
and agriculture sectors will also feel effects from the Bulgarian integration within the new
security system. While it is impossible to quantify these effects in terms of GDP growth at
this stage, they will undoubtedly contribute further to the growth potential of the Bulgarian
economy in the next decade.
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While the tangible economic effects of the eventual Bulgarian membership in NATO
described so far are not to be underestimated, it is the intangible benefits which are much
more important for the long run prospects of the Bulgarian economy.
The main problem perceived here was the international image of the country as a potential
market, and producer and exporter of goods. It was borne in mind that economically
Bulgaria was simultaneously seen in a double negative context: it was an ex-communist
country plus a Balkan country. In the minds of potential foreign partners, e.g. direct
investors, both contexts suggest higher risks and higher costs. “Ex-communist “would
suggest typical problems concomitant with change: inadequate legal framework, high level
of corruption, uncertain rules of the game; in a word, this produces a relatively high level of
business insecurity. “Balkan” in its turn would suggest problems resulting from lack of
change: inter ethnic and inter-state tensions, threatening and effectively breaking the peace
in the region. The result is simply a high level of personal insecurity. The two negative
contexts combined would explain to a large extent why in Bulgaria in recent years there is
much less foreign investment than the country’s economic potential could objectively
absorb.
It also explains why Bulgaria is so keen on joining NATO. NATO’s context is different – if
not the opposite – of both “post-communist” and “Balkan”. The general change that post-
communism is associated with becomes concrete, orderly and clearly targeted once it is
formulated as “change Bulgaria so that it can join NATO”. Inter-ethnic and inter-state
tension and strife are seen as problems that can find political solutions while eventual
NATO membership of all opposing groups dictates Balkan peace. Thus, both personal and
business insecurity should see a drastic drop once Bulgaria joins NATO.
Formally put, NATO membership will improve the institutional framework of the
Bulgarian economy and will effectively decrease transaction costs. This means that state
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organs will become more effective and the state – stronger in enforcing its rules. Contracts
will become more secure, and business security will increase in general. This will enhance
the predictability of the environment and will improve the competitiveness of the internal
business environment.
All these tangible and intangible economic effects of NATO membership will contribute to
the Bulgarian development and will add anywhere between 0.5 and 1 percentage point to
annual economic growth rates. As a result employment opportunities will increase as well
as higher revenue to the state budget. This means not only more and higher salaries, but also
higher pensions and generally improved welfare.
On the other hand, Bulgarians understand that stricter measures of border control would be
necessary after the terrorist attacks. However, Bulgaria has already accepted the negatives
of collective membership. A recent example is the introduction of visas to Russian citizens,
after Bulgaria became part of the Shengen space; Russia answered by introducing visas for
Bulgarians. All this is of course bad for business and other connections. From a Bulgarian
point of view however, there is also a positive side. Internationally sanctioned stricter
border control can help Bulgaria in its struggle to be a barrier to drug-trafficking and other
smuggler’s routes that pass through its territory. In this respect as well, higher border
security would make Bulgaria a better place for domestic and international business.
Bulgaria's joining NATO is also the best guarantee for sustaining Bulgarian ethnic model.
3. Better Bulgarian economy: better security
Concentrating on Bulgaria, we should consider the following major security tradeoffs of an
improved economic situation.
First and most obvious, personal perception of economic insecurity very frequently leads to
experience of general insecurity; this in its turn often results in asocial and occasionally
extremist behavior. Conversely, an improved economy will lower the level of general
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insecurity, alleviate social pressure and make society a safer place. Naturally, this will also
mean more money for government social programs and institutions. However, the main
beneficial effect is to be expected directly in individual level, and not via the social
institutions.
The other main tradeoff links economy and ethnopolitics. I predominantly closed societies,
and such are Balkan societies, discrimination against minorities takes also the form of
economic discrimination. Minorities are a rule poorer than majorities. And in situations of
crises they are the ones that usually get hit hardest. Their response also as a rule appends
political demands to their economic demands. In the Balkans, where practically all
minorities (the Roma excepted) are national minorities, i.e. look up to a “Mother Country”
which is usually a neighbor to the country in which they live, this is extremely dangerous.
The ethnic element easily transforms an economic problem into a political one, and that
political problem into an international issue. And we have repeatedly seen what ethnic
issues have done in Bulgaria and in the Balkans. An improvement in the economic climate
will not solve either domestic or regional ethnic issues. But an improved economic climate
will drastically lower the chance of such issues being raised.
C. The case for the countries that joined
Without the experience of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the case for ex-
communist countries (a) joining NATO, and (b) gaining economically from their
membership, would inevitably be only theory. However, these countries’ experience
provides a serious research database.  An example is Figure 2, showing the dynamic of total
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the three countries which became members of NATO in
1997 for the period 1993-2000.
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Figure 2. FDI in three CEE countries, 1993-2000, USD mln.
The graph gives ground for several observations.
First, there is a definite increase in total foreign direct investment attracted to the three
countries after they became members of NATO.
Second, the increase is especially large in Poland. There is also a large increase in the
Czech Republic, while FDI inflow in Hungary remains virtually unchanged.
To take up the Polish case: this could be related to the peculiar security position of Poland
before being accepted as a NATO member. Apparently international business knew of
Poland’s promising economic capacity; what drove off direct investors was their perception
of Poland as a country “more insecure” than Hungary or the Czech Republic, obviously due
to Poland’s position next to the ex-USSR. NATO membership did not move Poland
geographically – but in the investor’s mind, with Poland in NATO that was no longer
needed. Mutatis mutandis, NATO membership will not remove Bulgaria from the Balkan
Peninsula, but it will guard it from “balkanization”.
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In theory, the link between NATO membership and FDI inflow increases may also be seen
as a coincidence. FDI increases could be related to developments in structural reforms, to
opening of negotiations for EU membership. In any case, however, the importance of the
security environment in the three countries cannot be ignored. Security concerns include
political security, property rights security and enforcement. All these concerns are closely
related to a country’s capacity to be a NATO member. And all of them are important factors
in the decisions of international investors.
D. NATO’s new role
Naturally, it is for the Alliance itself to formulate its re-action and pro-action strategy in the
new circumstances. The few points that follow might be of interest merely as an outsider’s
view.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, which was won by the NATO countries, NATO managed
to change its reality as well as its image. From a territory defender it became a security
provider. This is a different type of service. Territorial defense is a service to people from
the territories in question only. It is provided on the assumption that territorial defense is
delivered, should the circumstances demand it, at the expense the life and well being of
people living in surrounding territories. Security provision is of a different nature
altogether: it is a service to all mankind.  True, it is provided at the expense of member
states only. But it is a maxim of today’s world political and military doctrines that particular
security is unattainable without general security. September 11, 2001 has been an awful
demonstration of the truth of this tenet. On the other hand, such terrorist attacks naturally
result in putting to the test the transatlantic link. Along with business and cultural links,
NATO has a special transatlantic role. It is both a reality and a symbol of Euroamericanism.
This kind of “symbolic reality” should prove harder to destroy than other symbols of our
civilization. Terrorism has so far only made it stronger; it is to be expected that the new
type of terrorism will just forge a stronger type of link.  All that could be said from outside
the Alliance is that it should continue its development as a provider of world security. There
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is no doubt that NATO will map its new course in the same rational, considerate, and
peace- seeking spirit in which it has on the whole managed to operate so far.
E. Conclusion
The new world context provides a basis for the following policy recommendations:
Bulgaria should increase its effort and change more rapidly in order to become a NATO
member.
NATO should continue its evolution as security provider to face the challenge of new
global terrorism.
International business should realize that an investment in Bulgarian economy is an
investment in world security.
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Concrete Considerations
This report maps the economic dimensions of the future membership of Bulgaria and other
countries of SEE in NATO. It should pave the way for an Action Plan on the part of
business to support and exploit for the joint benefit business and community the process of
NATO enlargement.
Three main aspects of the economic dimensions of NATO enlargement into SEE are
highlighted:
The connection between security environment and economic environment;
The economic role of the defense and security sector modernization;
The implications for the defense industry and civilian industry sectors.
It means that to enjoy economic development there has to be security achieved through
cooperation and integration which requires inter-operable and high-tech forces with
capabilities for early warning and scaleable rapid reaction to large spectrum of missions.
Last but not least, a sophisticated defense industry is required, integrated internationally,
and with a civil sector that benefits from security and reinforces security.
This report, being a first of its kind, could hardly be expected to be exhaustive; but it should
focus discussion professionally and simultaneously make it more transparent to the general
public. The aim is to cover not only purely technical and financial, but also organizational,
legislative, technological and even educational aspects of NATO accession.
The organizational/legislative aspect is a key one, because it can provide transparency,
which if supported by appropriate management IT and implemented by educated and
motivated people can produce really good results. To enjoy the economic benefits of NATO
enlargement into SEE, it is vital to implement re-engineering in the security and economic
areas - it means that while one can join NATO only after reforms, still more incentives from
actual membership can be obtained only after even deeper reforms.
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It should be borne in mind that investments in security do not end up military alley: they
guarantee security of general investments and freedom of trade, which is a prerequisite for
economic growth and prosperity.
The current situation in the area of defense modernization is defined by the status of the
following sub-areas:
Studies in defense reform, administrative reform, modernization and use of
consultants;
Reform plans and their implementation;
Membership action plan, interoperability goals, partnership goals;
Preparation of modernization plans;
Introducing of PPBS and Acquisition system;
Hierarchy of doctrinal documents, system of training, assessment and certification;
Crisis management and other operations capabilities and their implementation;
Major utilization, modernization and re-equipment  projects;
Education and training (E&T), research and development (R&D).
The real reform in the defense and security sectors can hardly be achieved through the
efforts of the government alone. Business is to play an extremely important role especially
in the areas of utilization, modernization, re-equipment, outsourcing of services, dual use of
infrastructure construction and operation, common research and development, education
and training, optimal human resource management, building strategic partnerships between
companies (local and foreign) and implementing offset programs (usually such programs
are not only in the defense industry, but outside it too). In addition to the Europe of Defense
project, now the Europe of Armaments is launched, so we can and must participate.
Regional military cooperation is a success story, but it has to be supported by economic
regional cooperation in the defense industry in the context of general economic cooperation.
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Part 1.
Relationship between security and economic environment
The issue of NATO enlargement is not only of military importance. NATO and the EU can
be considered as parts of a process of uniting the community of countries, which were
covered by the Marshall Plan in order to provide a better security environment and
economic environment. So there is a very close relationship between security and
development, between security cooperation and economic cooperation.
Economic cooperation is explicitly mentioned in the Washington Treaty. There are more
additional dimensions of NATO integration than the purely military and even political
dimensions. Just a look at the titles of NATO committees, working groups, agencies, etc.,
would be revealing. There are: Economic Committee, Committee for European Airspace
Coordination, Science Committee, Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, Senior
Emergency Planning Committee, Committee on Information & Cultural Relations. There is
NATO Security Investment Program for key infrastructure, special programs to support less
developed member states to achieve required level of readiness, etc.
The BOA (basic ordering agreement) framework provides a better environment for contract
bidding. NATO is the most powerful transatlantic link - a bridge for exchange of know-how
and joint ventures.
After the horrible act of terrorism, the issue of NATO enlargement and the orientation of
the countries in the world will be even more crucial for their economic development.
Security is such a fundamental issue that without solving it in a proper way the solution of
all other problems will be under question. Countries, which share common security
arrangements will probably also be countries with extremely high level of economic
cooperation in all areas of trade and exchange.
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This chapter will review some of the imperatives, which have resulted in pursuit of NATO
enlargement strategies and their implications for NATO member states and those, which
have already been accepted in the Alliance. It will also elaborate on the implications, which
the enlargement process might have on Bulgaria’s national security and how this will effect
the economic environment and determine the success of reform plans of all aspects of the
democratic establishments.
Virtue and interest are inseparable.1
The Balkans, where Bulgaria has a central geographical location, have traditionally been
identified with conflict and instability. Thus, contemporary NATO security policy agenda is
more interested in dealing with current and imminent political and military crises than in
providing long–term investments. By the same token, Bulgaria could turn into a potential
partner for possible future coalitions against threats to regional security (definitely beyond
Bulgaria’s involvement during the Kosovo crisis of 1999) and also act as an effective
barrier to the international drug and arms trafficking channels passing through Southeast
Europe.
Security is a key word in the current Bulgarian agenda – the hierarchy of all Bulgarian
strategic documents is based upon the interrelation of factors such as security, prosperity
and democracy (National Security Strategy, 1998; Military Doctrine, 1999, etc.) A more
detailed analysis shows the interdependence of those three factors and will suggest that it
will be impossible to achieve the national security objectives without integration into
NATO and the EU. If we have to make the thesis simple and clear-cut, this means, on the
one hand, investments in security assets (such as defense capabilities), and on the other
hand, it deals with investment security (economic and political relations).2
Bulgarian security policy can be viewed from two different angles – one focuses on the
national security dimensions of the economic policy, and the other on the economic
                                                          
1 President Thomas Jefferson, correspondence “To Logan,” 1816, in Saul K. Padover, ed.,
Democracy (New York: D. Appleton  - Century Company, 1939,) 42
2 this concept has been developed in a paper prepared by Ralitza Mateeva, “Determinants of U.S.
Security Policy Toward Bulgaria,” July 1999, NPS, Monterey , CA; an abstract available at
www.nps.navy.mil
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dimensions of the national security. The discussion on national security policy vs. national
economic policy never puts the benefits of NATO enlargement into question. Searching its
new place, post-Cold War Bulgaria has made its adjustments and laid out the priorities.
“NATO’s enlargement is about America’s role in Europe – whether America will remain
an European power and whether a larger democratic Europe will remain organically
linked to America.”3
The whole idea of NATO enlargement was a direct implication of President Clinton’s
adaptation of the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, which
declared the promotion of democracy to be one of the keys to ensuring security in the post-
Cold War world.
Our national security strategy [NSS] is…based on enlarging the community of market
democracies while deterring and limiting a range of threats to our nation, our allies and
our interests4
The ideal of fostering peace and (ultimately) security through democracy is a recurring
theme throughout U.S. history and this can be brilliantly illustrated by the unquestionable
success of the Marshall Plan that helped rebuild Western Europe after the Second World
War and not only created the foundation for establishing democracy and market economy,
but brought security that pre-determined the prosperity of the West European nations. The
same concept, applied in Japan, brought results that confirmed the success of this policy.
The end of the Cold War in 1989 was a long anticipated and widely desired event, but ten
years after this historic development, some analyses of its aftermath suggest that the West is
still unprepared to deal with the new challenges of the emerging democracies in
Southeastern Europe. The communist threat is gone, but historically-determined emotions
and sensitivities, weak civic cultures and traditions, as well as ruined economies, threaten
the hopes for a quick recovery of the ex-communist states and their entry into the
community of the prosperous and democratic states. The latest developments in FYROM
                                                          
3 Brzezinski, Zbigniew ”Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.” Federal News Service
09.10(1997) Available[Online]:LEXIS-NEXIS/news/mags/”nato enlargement”[10 February 1998]
4 President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (
Washington D.C.: The White House, 1996), 2-3
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and the activities that followed with the involvement of the international community present
an example that upholds this observation.
The United States and its NATO allies have made various commitments regarding the
security challenges that have arisen in South Eastern Europe since the early 1990’s.  The
period saw grave security problems emerge in the Balkan region, and this challenged
security and stability throughout the European continent and the Middle East as well.
Russia’s traditional interests concerning the Balkans were put into question, and Moscow
expressed its concern regarding these events. America’s security interests in the region stem
from the new role it plays as a major guarantor of international order and from the
objectives flowing from this role – promoting democracy and free-market economic
systems.
The SEE region countries share the same interest with the United States in the preservation
of the current security institutions (NATO) and the U.S. naval and air presence which
guarantees the security architecture. America seems to support and encourage a better and
stronger European commitment in the region, especially after the evolution of the opinion
of the Southern European states, which derives from their strong European commitment
(laid out during the Helsinki meeting in 2000). The United States do not change the
direction of their policies but at the same time sends a clear message that America will
continue to be involved in European affairs. The debate over the out-of-area operations is
likely to become a subject of new commitments, both from the United States and its NATO
allies, because of the new rationale of the threats toward the Alliance coming from North
Africa and the Middle East.
Traditionally, NATO has played an important role both as a vehicle for linking transatlantic
and European interests and as a symbol of Southern European membership in the Western
“club.”  The progressive Europeanization of the countries of NATO’s Southern Region has
created an alternative institutional focus in the form of the EU. The trend of deepening the
European linkages between the Mediterranean powers within Europe does not necessarily
suggests a counterbalancing role to the U.S. influence in the region. One may argue that this
is not essential but the fact that most of the SEE countries are members of PfP and are
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subjected to MAP procedures, suggests that in spite of all EU integration efforts they see
NATO enlargement if not as a prerequisite at least as an essential effort for EU integration.
The reasoning behind the European tolerance of the U.S. influence in the regional affairs
stems from the character of the problems coming from the a general concern about security
related issues, including immigration, economic and political development as they might
affect north-south relations. The other explanation could be that being busy with its own
internal affairs (the Euro; ESDP etc.), Europe is willing to put the US face to face with the
issues that seem not to have easy answers (the latest developments in FYROM are a good
example of this observation.)
Actually, one of the most difficult questions to be answered, and the relatively persistent
fears, which the West had to face, promoting the expansion of its economic and security
institutions, was the reaction of Russia. NATO opted to move slowly on enlargement in the
hope and belief that by doing so it could use the intervening period to persuade Moscow
that enlargement was not directed against it. Ronald Asmus admitted in 1996 “It is up to
Russia to decide for itself whether it wants to help build this common new European
security order or to fight with it.”5
Obviously the Russian factor was of significance, because the process of decision-making
for enlarging NATO took some time and “Western policy was turned into a kind of Chinese
water torture in which every couple of months we pledge to enlarge.”6 In spite of the recent
adaptations of Russia’s international behavior, it still is an important factor. In the
presentation “America’s Choices at the Next NATO Summit ”in Tallinn, May 2001, the
President of the American Committee for NATO Bruce Jackson, points out as one of the
key issues to be resolved “…outreach with Russia – responding to President Putin”. For
SEE and Bulgaria this presents additional challenge not only because of Russia’s traditional
role in the Balkans, but primarily because of the current economic investments which large
Russian companies have made in strategic sectors of Bulgarian economy. This again proves
                                                          
5 Amus, Ronald D. “Stop Fussing NATO Enlargement and Get on With It.” International Herald Tribune
09.12.(1997) Available[Online];
6 again there
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that the enlargement of NATO will be determined not only by security policies but by
economic policies as well.
However, there is a necessity of “maturing” of relationships on both sides of the Atlantic
and promoting broader political and economic interactions, which therefore will create a
new basis for the traditional security assistance and security arrangements associated with
the “western” presence in the region. A good example would be the Stability Pact
involvement in the region after 1999. In spite of all the achievements, there has been a lot of
criticism over the actual goals and purposes of this organization, especially its ability to
sustain influence over the largest infrastructure projects that have been scheduled to rebuild
the region after the conflicts of the 1990s. The regional players are concerned that the
intentions stated at the beginning and the actual results achieved so far do not present a
solid case to prove that the Stability Pact is the second Marshall Plan.
The NATO enlargement process is doubtless going to continue. However, at this stage there
isn’t enough clarity as to particulars. With the admission of new members, or with the long-
term process of integrating into the NATO and EU structures the countries, which had
already managed to ride the first wave.  The overlapping agendas of the different institution
and organizations that are involved sometimes present a significant management challenge
for the “recipient states.”
A conceptual notion of Bulgaria’s position on the further NATO enlargement discussions
will be unquestionably the aspect of the level of foreign investments that have been made in
Bulgaria. This is especially true of the depth of the U.S. investments and economic interests
in the region (IT industry, finance, flow of resources, infrastructure etc.). A useful policy
lesson may be drawn from the three new members of NATO  - Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic.  The obvious advantage of the enlargement process could be seen in the
adaptation of those countries’ economies to the “strategic industries” that have been
provided with security for their investments because there has been significant investment
in their security.
For SEE and especially for Bulgaria most of the “strategic industries” such as: transit of
information, energy and goods, including powerful transport hubs; different types of
tourism; IT and especially software development; education and training/research and
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development; agriculture, ecology, production, etc., are very high security sensitive. At the
same time SEE, because of the geographic location, close to the Middle East, the
Mediterranean, the Caucasus and Central Asia from one side and Western Europe on the
other side is under serious insecurity pressure. So, security arrangements that are a type of
specific business have to be larger than in other regions, but to be commonly funded in the
framework of NATO and EU, because the benefit is common as well. To be eligible for this
NATO membership is required.
Of course the building of a common security space will create larger markets and
opportunities for joint projects, at the same time competition will be tougher as well and the
role of strategic partnership, framework agreements and other tools for competitiveness and
stability in the security modernization area will grow in importance.
A good point about enlargement being a wave-by-wave process – is that it allows for better
preparation, using the experience of the previous wave. Through NATO integration not
only the military and politicians are integrated, but industry as well. The Washington MAP
program is a good illustration here.
The more specific issues of force modernization and defense industry are considered in the
next two chapters. It is important to mention that nowadays force modernization is closely
linked with civil sector modernization, the civil sector even playing a leading role, that is
quite different from the past - simply the defense industry and the defense establishment as
a whole have to pursue the civil sector and to compete harder for resources. In many cases
security is as important for the civil sector as it is for the defense sector and the defense
establishment, that is another area for links and exchange. Having in mind the downsizing
issue, another economic challenge is how to use in the best way people released from the
defense business (government and industry). Introducing professionalism in the security
sector has many economic implications as well influence in the area of education and
training.
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Part 2.
Economic Aspects of Defense Modernization
This chapter covers key issues of defense modernization and re-equipment of armed forces,
including resource aspects of modernization. Given the diversity among the countries in
South Eastern Europe, we do not try to compare their defense establishments and
modernization efforts. Instead, the chapter provides detailed description of the Bulgarian
case. Although Bulgaria differs from other countries in the region in terms of its excessive
military and defense industrial infrastructure, inherited from the recent past, we shall focus
on common principles and support them with specific examples from the experience of the
Bulgarian Ministry of Defense. The chapter starts with description of defense reform
requirements and the necessity to introduce a rigorous defense resource management
system. Secondly, we describe organizational and procedural changes, essential for the
creation of a flexible acquisition process, compatible with acquisition systems and practices
of NATO and EU member countries. Next we outline the main elements of the new
acquisition planning, listing current priorities and presenting an ongoing force
modernization study. The chapter covers also the role of research and development in
modernization, as well as potential national and international cooperation activities.
Modernization as an integral part of the defense reform
Most countries in South Eastern Europe undergo comprehensive defense reforms aimed at
adapting their defense establishment to the post-Cold War security environment and the
new challenges to security in this historically volatile region. Bulgaria, among them, made
significant progress in the last three years with the adoption of a new Concept for National
Security, new Military Doctrine and reform plans known as “Plan-2004”. The reform plans
were developed under strict civilian oversight to allow balanced and gradual development
of capabilities to perform expected tasks and missions. Figure 3 presents the general
defense-planning framework. Thus, modernization plans are developed in a coherent way to
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meet national security requirements. Particularly, force development plans are designed so
that the Bulgarian military would effectively perform 18 tasks grouped in six mission areas.
Missions and tasks are listed in reference [Cornerstones]. Plans and programs to modernize
weapon systems, equipment, command and control, communications and information
systems, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems (C4ISR), defense and dual-
use infrastructure and building host nation support (HNS) capabilities are an integral part of
the defense planning process. The implementation of this general planning framework is
essential in providing guidance, e.g., to build and sustain required defense capabilities,
resource constraints and coordination of modernization plans with other force development
activities.
Figure 3. Modernization in the defense-planning framework
Furthermore, Bulgaria introduced a rigorous defense resource management system, fully
compatible with the NATO defense planning system. Finally, as one of the states striving
for NATO membership in the near future, Bulgaria has its own Membership Action Plan,
annual programs for its implementation and participates in the NATO Planning and Review
Process (PARP). In regard to modernization, and force development as a whole, plans are
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designed to meet the requirements of the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI)
which during the planning process is specified in a set of Partnership Goals (PGs).
Although current plans do not specifically focus on capabilities required by EU member
states, their implementation would allow significant future contribution to overcome the
capability gaps defined by the European Union.
Given these tools, the will of all political parties represented in Parliament and the
dedication of the political majority and its Government, Bulgarian planners were able to
draft mid- and long-term plans, that approximate future costs and budget levels with a
reasonable accuracy. These plans are based on the assumption of sustaining the defense
budget as a percentage of the GDP and are refined to better meet requirements of future
NATO membership. Table 1 presents forecasted defense budget levels and budget
distributions [Cornerstones].
Table 1
MOD BUDGET FOR THE PERIOD 2001-2015 BY APPROPRIATIONS
/Million BGN/
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2010 2015
Personnel cost 445.0 489.3 482.1 419.2 459.1 503.0 551.3 713.7 872.2
O&M 216.3 190.3 210.7 296.6 286.2 288.6 284.5 289.3 290.9
Investment 84.3 151.7 208.6 255.4 300.9 337.7 368.9 438.7 508.1
R&D 2.5 4.6 6.9 9.6 13.2 14.7 15.3 19.1 22.3
Budget MoD 748.1 835.9 908.3 980.8 1059.4 1144.0 1220.0 1460.8 1693.5
MOD BUDGET FOR THE PERIOD 2001-2015 BY APPROPRIATIONS
/IN PERCENTAGE/
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2010 2015
Personnel cost 59.5% 58.5% 53.1% 42.8% 43.3% 44.0% 45.2% 48.9% 51.5%
O&M 28.9% 22.8% 23.2% 30.2% 27.1% 25.2% 23.7% 19.8% 17.2%
Investment 11.3% 18.1% 23.0% 26.0% 28.4% 29.5% 29.9% 30.0% 30.0%
R&D 0.3% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3%
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This budget distribution provides for the necessary maintenance of the planned force
structure, training according to NATO standards and modernizing the force to build and
sustain the capabilities necessary for national defense, reasonable contribution to NATO or
EU crisis response operations and significant contribution to collective defense. Strictly
following reform plans, after 2004 the modernization budget7 will amount to 25 % of the
Bulgarian defense budget. Thus, Bulgaria will meet the Common European Security and
Defense Policy target figure [Andreani, Bertram and Grant] and will exceed the NATO
floor for modernization spending [RAND, 2001]. Figure 4 shows one modernization
indicator, defined as defense spending in purchasing power parity dollars per troop
[RAND].
Figure 4. Bulgarian MoD budget per troop and 1999 NATO floor in PPP dollars
Figure 4 represents the modernization opportunities for the Bulgarian armed forces
compared with the 1999 NATO floor [RAND, 2001]. The indicator is defined as
purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars per troop. Calculations are based on personnel and
budget data in [0028, Preliminary Rep].
                                                          
7 The figures for “modernization” and “investment” differ. According to Bulgarian legislation, modernization,
re-equipment and new defense infrastructure spending constitutes only part of the investment budget. The
latter further includes overhaul of weapon systems, equipment and infrastructure, as well as building of
barracks, housing, etc. The adoption of common NATO definitions is strongly recommended.
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Furthermore, additional money for modernization would be available through security
assistance programs and specific national programs, i.e., for harmonization of the frequency
spectrum management with EU norms. These resources may amount to over 10 percent of
the modernization budget. They are not included in Table 1.
Thus, the comprehensive approach to the defense reform and the strict implementation of
reform plans provide opportunities for modernization. To use these opportunities wisely, a
number of prerequisites have to be met. The experience of Bulgaria provides examples of
organizational and procedural changes, considered essential for adequate modernization.
Organizational and procedural prerequisites
Analyzing problems of the existing acquisition system, the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense
launched an effort to adapt the acquisition process to provide for more effective spending of
taxpayers’ money. Functioning closely with the resource management system, the new
acquisition system (in its draft version) is intended:
To relate mission needs (capability gaps) to user/operational requirements to system
and technical requirements to procurement decisions;
To account for the life cycle cost of intended materiel solutions;
To be transparent to decision makers, potential users and suppliers;
To provide flexibility and efficiency;
To be compatible with the acquisition systems of NATO [AAP-20] and member
countries [US, UK, NL].
In order to support this advanced acquisition system, the Council of Ministers by its
Decree) # 58 of 08 March 2001 established the Armaments Policy Directorate (APD) as the
principal coordinator of all modernization activities. According to the current Organic Law
of the Ministry of Defense, APD performs the following main functions:
Co-ordinates planning, programming and the implementation of the armaments
policy;
Develops the scientific and technological policy of the Ministry of Defense and
organizes its implementation;
30
Supports the implementation of the standardization, codification and state quality
control of armaments and special products, their certification, as well as the
certification of quality assurance systems of the producers;
Supports the development of a policy for scientific, R&D and armaments co-
operation.
Furthermore, the Director of the Armaments Policy Directorate is national representative to
the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) with the responsibility to co-
ordinate planning, programming and implementation of the armaments policy.
As National Armaments Director, the Director of APD coordinates the national
representation in all CNAD Work Groups – NATO Army, Navy and Air Force armaments
groups, the Research and Technology Organization, NIAG, as well as the groups on
acquisition practices, standardization, quality assurance, codification, etc. Thus, purposeful
training of the personnel is achieved in addition to the specific practical gains derived from
the activity of the respective groups.
In cooperation with the J4, J5 and J6 directorates of the General Staff, the Procurement
Directorate, the Budget Planning and Management Directorate, the Executive Agency for
Armaments and Equipment Testing and Control Measurements, and the Institute Advanced
Defense Research, the APD organizes the execution of the activities at all stages of the
system’s life-cycle, from concept to disposal. The interaction with the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System is implemented through the MoD Defense Planning
Directorate (DPD) and the Defense and Force Planning Directorate (J5) of the General
Staff, while the logistic support is executed through the Materiel Command.
Comparing this organizational structure with the experience of NATO countries, the
Armaments Policy Directorate, parts of the Procurement Directorate and the Executive
Agency for Armaments and Equipment Testing and Control Measurements can be seen as a
“Procurement Agency” – partner with CNAD and its working groups. Additionally, the
Logistics Directorate (J4) of the General Staff and the Central Logistics Command are
roughly equivalent to a “Logistics Organization” – the partner of the NATO Materiel and
Supply Agency (NAMSA).
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Furthermore, a Modernization Council has been established for formulating the MoD policy
in the field of armaments, equipment and infrastructure, similar in functions to the US
Defense Acquisition Board. In interaction with the Programming Council and the Defense
Capabilities Council (to be established), the Modernization Council gives the main
directions for development of the armament and equipment for the needs of the Armed
Forces. In this interaction the Programming Council identifies defense policy priorities, and
the Defense Capabilities Council identifies mission needs, authorizes operational
requirements, provides guidance and priorities balancing planned defense capabilities. The
activity of the three Councils is supported by Expert Technical-Economic Councils on C4I
Systems, on Military Standardization and on Research and Development (R&D), as well as
Expert Technical Committees (ETC) on the Services level. The interaction of all these
organizations is represented on Figure 5.
Figure 5. Organizational support for the acquisition process.
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Dashed lines represent organizations in forming. The following abbreviations are used:
DPD- Defense Planning Directorate; APD - Armaments Policy Directorate; J5 - Defense
and Force Planning Directorate at the General Staff; J6 – Communications and Information
Systems Directorate at the General Staff; DCHOD – Deputy-Chief of Defense; EC - Expert
Council; ETEC- Expert Technical-Economic Council; ETC - Expert Technical Committee.
Programs for modernization are inherent part of the programming process in the Ministry of
Defense under the following program structure:
Program number:
# 1.6: Weapons systems and equipment for the Land Forces
# 2.6: Weapons systems and equipment for the Air Force
# 3.6: Weapons systems and equipment for the Navy
# 4.8: Systems and equipment for logistics and medical support
# 12: C4, Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance systems (C4ISR)
Program # 12 covers the introduction of advanced information technologies in education,
staff training, simulation based training of troops, as well as navigation systems and
systems for electronic surveillance and warfare.
The development of defense and dual-use infrastructure is considered as part of the
respective modernization programs of the services and the joint logistics command.
Additionally, scientific and R&D support for modernization is provided through a centrally
managed program, known as main program # 10.
All modernization programs are developed by the respective services and commands under
the coordination of the Armaments Policy Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.
The authorized modernization programs are part of the Program Decision Memorandum
(PDM) of the Ministry of Defense. PDM has a six-year horizon and serves for budgeting for
the first of the future years.
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Modernization project management is carried out by Integrated Project Teams. In practice,
this approach has been realized in the implementation of the Field Integrated
Communication and Information System (FICIS) for the needs of the Bulgarian Armed
Forces units and formations, the Air Sovereignty Operational Center (ASOC), etc. The
main directives for their development and the solution of the problems of critical
importance is done by Supervisory Boards. There is only one level of subordination
between the project team and the body controlling the acquisition processes and the
modernization programs – the Modernization Council.
The document information base through which the defense acquisition activities are carried
out incorporates a number of normative and standardization documents regulating the
requirements to the individual stages. The documents are developed according to Bulgarian
priorities for European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Notable among them are the Law on
Public Tenders, published in State Gazette No 56, 22 June 1999, the Regulations for Public
Tenders, and the Instruction on Planning, Organization and Control of Logistic Support,
Construction and Construction Services in the Ministry of Defense (IMS No 1/07.02.2001).
The main purpose of these documents is to provide transparency of planning and
competitiveness in the implementation of procurement decision.
Rigorous planning for modernization
Since the start of the defense reform, capital investments continuously grow. Figure 6
represents the trend of increase (1 BG Lev = 1 DM), where security assistance programs are
focused on the introduction of advanced communications and information systems. For the
current year, the spending on R&D, overhaul, modernization and procurement of weapon
systems and equipment, and construction accounts for 11 percent of the defense budget,
while planned security assistance is equivalent to another 3.5 % of the defense budget. One
additional program dedicated to harmonization of the frequency spectrum with EU norms
brings investments in communications systems equivalent to another 5.8 % of the defense
budget. Thus, Bulgaria already has conditions for implementation of moderate
modernization programs.
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Figure 6: Capital investments, mln. BG levs
Initial priorities were defined by the Bulgarian Parliament in the Military Doctrine.
According to article 97 “… priority in the modernization of the Armed Forces is that they
have the control, command, surveillance, intelligence, communications, mutual
identification, computerization, navigation, (including with airspace systems, means and
technologies), that would enable interoperability with the Armed Forces of the NATO
countries and take into account the country's transformation to an information society.”
Then, with the introduction of the planning framework and the defense resource
management system described in the previous section, the following priorities for
modernization were defined for the years till 2006.
General modernization priorities:
Improvement of the C2 at international, national, strategic and tactical levels;
Development of infrastructure for logistics support;
Improvement of intelligence, surveillance and night vision systems;
Developments of plans for the introduction of high precision weapons;
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Establishment of simulation training centers for HQs and troops, as well as
simulation-based training of soldiers and crews;
Improvement of capabilities to transport troops, equipment and supplies;
Introduction of distance learning systems;
Priorities in modernizing Land Forces:
Clothing, equipment and medical support for troops and HQs participating in PfP
operations;
Autonomous ground sensors for detection, identification and surveillance of combat
equipment and people;
Surveillance and targeting systems for artillery units;
Modernization of SHORAD/VSHORAD capabilities;
Facilitate computer-assisted exercises at operational and tactical levels for all HQs
and units participating in PfP operations;
Priorities in modernizing the Air Force:
Modernization of aircraft and equipment dedicated for participation in NATO-led
operations;
Ensure full NATO interoperability of communications, navigation and supporting
equipment of two military air bases;
Start introduction of advanced ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles;
Plan for introduction of advanced multipurpose fighter;
Complete the build-up of an interoperable IFF system;
Integrate the national Air Sovereignty Operations Center (ASOC) with the NATO
air defense system;
Priorities in modernizing the Navy:
Modernize the C2 system of the Navy and introduce Link-11 for frigates;
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Equip the units dedicated for peace support operations with interoperable FM and
SW communications, incl. security equipment;
Introduce capabilities for mine clearing at depths up to 80 meters;
Modernize auxiliary ships;
Introduce ship and port NATO standard equipment for  fuel and water supplies;
Priorities in modernizing Logistics:
Provide NATO-interoperable C2 system for operational logistics and support;
Equip airports, ports and railway stations for Host Nation Support (HNS) according
to NATO standards;
Provide capabilities for automatic logistics information processing and distribution
among national units and regional HQs according to NATO standards;
Establish organization and provide technical equipment for introducing F-34 fuel;
Provide equipment for a field hospital with 80 beds and surgical capacity;
Priorities in modernizing C4ISR systems:
Continue the priority development and implementation of C4ISR systems to achieve
interoperability with NATO at strategic, operational and tactical levels;
Build a National Military Command Center;
Operational readiness of a field integrated communications and information system
for one mechanized brigade and other units dedicated for NATO-led operations;
Equip all PSO-dedicated units and HQs with commercial mobile SATCOM
terminals.
For the implementation of these priorities, as well as to support the development of a long-
term modernization plan till 2015, the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense is currently
conducting a comprehensive Force Modernization Study. This long-term plan is particularly
important because the next round of NATO enlargement will be more difficult than the
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first. Aspirants will need to demonstrate that they can make significant contribution to
NATO’s overall military effectiveness - that they will be contributors to security not just be
consumers of it. The Alliance and the U.S. Senate will be focusing on the capabilities and
ability of candidates to contribute to NATO’s old and new missions. Since Bulgaria is one
of the countries in South East Europe that is a serious candidate for membership by the
NATO Summit in 2002, there is a need to begin developing a coherent, long-term plan for
modernization and rearmament, including Host Nation Support capabilities of the Bulgarian
Forces well in advance of the Summit. In this regard the MoD with the assistance of the US
Government performs this study as a basis for the development of a long-term
modernization plan for the Bulgarian Armed Forces to meet future security challenges and
prepare for NATO membership.
This study builds on the final report of the “Bulgarian defense reform study”, “Plan for
organization and development of the MoD by the year 2004”, the Membership Action Plan
including the Partnership Goals, “C4I study”. It will help the Bulgarian MoD to establish its
planning priorities for defense equipment modernization and rearmament:
What needs to be done by 2002;
What needs to be done by 2004;
What needs to be done by 2015.
The study has to fulfill the following tasks.
Task 1. Equipment Modernization and Rearmament:
Building on the existing assessments of the security environment and its implications on the
defense strategy and the military missions a joint Bulgarian-US team will evaluate
Bulgarian force plans and structure to assess its capability to execute the military missions
and tasks, with minimum risk and within forecasted resources. In this task, the Joint Team
will target near-term imperatives for ensuring the national security of Bulgaria. The Joint
Team will develop capabilities typical of modern Western militaries. This will include how
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the Bulgarian military can position itself to take advantage of the rapid advances of the
military technologies. The Study will also analyze the current status of the Bulgarian Armed
Forces armament and identify, in light of the new missions, weapon systems that can be
modernized and weapon systems that have to be declared obsolete, as well as ways to deal
with the obsolete equipment. The findings of the Study should give sufficient bases for the
development of a detailed program for armament and infrastructure modernization.
Task 2. Impact and Implications of Defense Capabilities Initiative:
The Joint Team will examine the possible impact and implications of DCI on Bulgaria’s
military strategy and modernization plans. The Team will also develop an implementation
strategy, outlining the key tasks that need to be carried out by Bulgaria to meet the DCI
requirements. The Team will identify those niche areas in which investment can bring
greatest DCI returns.
Task 3. Defense Industry Development:
The Joint Team will analyze the potential of the Bulgarian defense industry in the light of
its ability to support the modernization effort of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and identify
possible areas of cooperation between Bulgarian and US defense industries as well as trends
for future military technology developments.
Additional to the support by the US Government, the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense is in
contact with relative NATO authorities, as well as with other strategic partners to examine
specific areas of modernization. The final responsibility, however, rest with the Bulgarian
Government. Furthermore, the current intention is to send the Modernization Plan 2015 to
Parliament that would provide guidance, exercise final authority and dedicate resource in
long term.
The Modernization Plan 2015 will address several groups of issues, among them:
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Platforms. We expect decisions on a smaller numbers of multipurpose platforms of
fewer types accounting for logistical and interoperability requirements;
C4ISR. The expected focus is on integration of commercial-of-the-shelf state-of-
the-art products and dual-use technologies in joint technical architecture following
the requirements of the NATO common operating environment. Details are
provided in reference [I&S6];
Infrastructure. While releasing a big part of its excessive defense infrastructure,
Bulgaria will plan upgrades and modernization of the remaining military and dual-
use infrastructure to provide interoperability and host nation support capabilities.
Two additional areas are worth considering in terms of their economic aspects:
Increasing level of training that would require ammunitions, POL, spare parts, repair
and maintenance. Special importance deserves the issue of outsourcing
maintenance, e.g., depo-level inspections, repair and support;
Use of assets from trade, needed to sustain capabilities in the commercial business
to provide primarily for mobility (land, air and sea transport). In this respect the
Bulgarian leadership needs to address legal arrangements for the use of commercial
assets under market economy rules.
From the force modernization study and the debate on modernization we would expect a
stronger parliamentarian oversight and long-term support by the People’s Assembly (The
Bulgarian Parliament) to provide stability and continuity of defense plans and programs,
and in particular, of defense modernization programs.
Role of R&D
Closely following the major decisions on defense reform, in the spring of 1999 the Minister
of Defense commissioned a study on the status of Bulgarian defense R&D. During the
period from April till June 1999, the assigned working group analyzed all aspects of
defense R&D and proposed a Concept for consolidation of the R&D institutes. The working
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group concluded that the existing system for defense R&D is cumbersome and inefficient
and does not provide the necessary support to defense reform. For any practical purposes, in
the early 1990s defense R&D organizations had not been subject to reform or
accommodation to changing security requirements or declining defense budgets. At the time
of the study, 12 R&DTE organizations in the Ministry of Defense employed over 1,000
people. Over 700 scientists and engineers were employed in four main institutes. Well over
95 percent of their budget were spent on personnel and basic maintenance. Research
programs were heavily oriented towards narrow military R&D, with hardware
developments prevalent. The organization did not provide for efficient incorporation of
COTS technologies. Almost ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, research was still
oriented towards requirements of Cold war armies and the Bulgarian defense industrial
complex, relying on ever narrowing markets.
R&D Reengineering
The Concept for consolidation of the R&D institutes, approved by the Minister of Defense
in June 1999, called for a national re-engineering effort, intrinsic part of the plans for
comprehensive defense reform.
During 1999, the Bulgarian defense R&D establishment underwent major restructuring. Out
of four R&D institutes within the Ministry of Defense one consolidated organization was
created. Under the name “Institute for Advanced Defense Research” (IADR), it became part
of the “G.S. Rakovski” Defense College in Sofia. Currently, it employs 37 researchers,
including the full-time doctoral students. Additionally, the Defense College and the service
academies currently employ close to 1,000 faculty members. Over half of them teach in
various areas of technology and are partially involved in research projects.
The Institute for Advanced Defense Research provides support to defense policy
formulation and defense planning in developing weapon systems, organizational structures,
C2, infrastructure, air defense, logistics, etc. IADR scientists participate in the formulation
of requirements towards specific weapon systems and materiel and assessment of products
and systems. Additionally, they provide for continuity through teaching the “Rakovsky”
College, including education of doctoral students.
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The budget for defense R&D is rapidly growing (see Table 1). According to the Ministerial
Programming Guidance, constrained by the input of the Ministry of Finance, by the year
2005 the R&D budget will reach 1.2-1.3 percent of the defense budget – a figure typical for
Western NATO member countries of similar size and ambition levels. The trend for the
R&D budget is represented on figure 5. Current the MoD contracts defense research in the
following areas:
Command and control systems;
Computer networks;
Decision support systems;
Simulation in staff training;
Information assurance;
Implementation of space-based remote sensing technologies;
Remotely controlled robots for hazardous environments;
“Intelligent” / remotely controlled mine fields;
Optical and electro-optical surveillance systems;
Radar modernization;
Information processing in radar systems;
Protection from laser guided munitions;
Passive protection of armored vehicles;
NBC protection;
Electro-chemical batteries.
In the beginning of 2001, the Ministry of Defense structured S&T, R&D in a way similar to
the one used by the NATO Research and Technology Organization. It covers nine broad
areas:
System research
Sensors and sensor systems
CIS Technologies
Modeling and Simulation
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Transport Technologies
Armaments and Ammunition
Materiel, incl. armor, explosives, cloth, fuels, etc.
NBC defense and ecology
Social, psychological and medical research
Cooperation
The Bulgarian Ministry of Defense, in coordination with the Bulgarian Academy of
Sciences, universities and the defense industry, works on better structuring the national
defense R&D efforts, as well as on expanding the co-operation in R&D and technology
development with other countries, primarily NATO and EU members or aspirants.
At the end of 1999, the Ministry of Defense signed a Framework agreement for cooperation
with the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences which includes approximately 90 institutes and
laboratories with over 8,000 scientists. In the spring of 2001 similar agreement was signed
with the University of National and World Economics. Agreements with other leading
Bulgarian universities are under preparation.
Bulgaria regularly participates in the meetings of the NATO Research and Technology
Board (RTB), open for partner countries. R&D cooperation is established also on a bilateral
basis. During the year 2000, a Dutch-Bulgarian Memorandum of Understanding regarding
exchange of data and cooperation in defense research and technology was signed. The first
joint project in the area of space based remote sensing was successfully accomplished in
2000. Several new joint projects are underway.
Bulgarian research institutes have established cooperation with US defense R&D
organizations, mainly through the Edison House in London. Several joint projects have
been accomplished or are currently implemented. Most notable are the projects in the area
light armor and naval mine warfare.
The international R&D cooperation has a driving role for reengineering Bulgarian defense
research. It provides focus in conceptualizing, expanding the research area and addressing
new requirements. Furthermore, it allows transfer of R&D management practices and
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facilitates international cooperation activities of Bulgarian universities and research
institutes.
Thus, the R&D reengineering contributes to increased compatibility between Bulgaria and
NATO and member countries. It provides a foundation for increased international
cooperation in the future, i.e., in the area of joint procurement.
Defense modernization as driver for cooperation
During the last decade the Bulgarian defense have been significantly decapitalized. No
major platforms have been acquired in more than twelve years. However, national security
requirements and the perspective for NATO and EU membership drive a defense reform
allowing for extensive modernization. Combined with the rapidly increasing levels of
training and R&D (see Figure 7), modernization may have a catalyzing effect on economic
development and international defense industrial cooperation.
      Figure 7. Economic potential of defense modernization.
Cooperation in the area of R&D is just one example how defense reform and modernization
may contribute economy through technological advancement. The cooperation on a national
level among the Ministry of Defense, the academic sector and the defense industry has the
potential to maintain and find new niches of competitiveness on the global markets.
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This cooperation will be stronger if the coordination among various Bulgarian users is
improved. Given the changes in the security environment after the end of the Cold war, and
in particular the rising importance of risks and threats that do not fit traditional patterns of
military threats, Bulgarian defense planers pay considerable attention to the integration of
various security instruments. The 1998 Concept for National Security and the 1999 Military
Doctrine envision and require such integration. Thus, the armed forces, the troops of the
Ministry of Interior, in particular Border Police and the Gandarmerie type of units, the Civil
Protection Agency and the security services need to provide complementary capabilities to
undertake the full spectrum of missions and tasks in order to guarantee the national security
of Bulgaria. These capabilities will be sustained in terms of organization, procedures
(doctrine), training and technology, Respectively, modernization plans should account for
interoperability with emphasis on all command and control functions, and when practical,
commonality of weapon systems, equipment and infrastructure.
The MoD science and technology, R&D, test and evaluation programs are tools for national
integration, and at the same time – vehicle for integration of the Bulgarian scientific, R&D
community in the respective communities of the Western democracies.
The availability of compatible acquisition processes would allow to explore various
frameworks for cooperation. One obvious framework is the cooperation in South Eastern
Europe building on the successful security and defense cooperation. Another potential
framework is among the former Warsaw Pact member countries, having similar equipment
and dealing with similar heritage.
One potential start is in the area of defense technology demonstrations, using traditional for
a such as the exhibition of defense industries HEMUS in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. The next
exhibition is in the last week of May 2002.
Without breaking the relations with its traditional partners, Bulgaria is reorienting the
modernization programs towards cooperation with future allies and partners form NATO
and the European Union. Bulgaria needs strategic industrial partnerships with its future
allies. Specific forms of economic cooperation will be examined in the next chapter.
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Part 3.
Implications on defense industry and civil industry
Defining a defense industry base in general and even for a separate country is not an easy
task (Kapstein, p. 91, 1992). The related issues become more complicated when we are
looking for the relevant definition for the different countries of Southeast Europe. To
simplify the questions we can accept the term “defense industries”, which includes all
national companies, more and less specialized in manufacturing and producing weapons
and defense systems.
Analyzing the defense industries of the SEEC we can see two different groups of countries.
The first includes Bulgaria, Romania, and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, from the Eastern
and Central Balkans, which have developed defense industries quite sufficient for their
industrial base. In the period of the Cold War the countries had (from one to two) hundred
different sized defense companies. Bulgaria and Romania were sufficient contributors to the
arsenal of the eastern block and its dependents around the world and were faced with the
collapse of a significant sector of their economies when the Warsaw Pact and the
COMECON were dissolved. The Atlantic Council of US publication stated; “No country
faced such problems in more acute form than Bulgaria, which at its Cold War height
produced ten percent of its gross domestic product in the defense sector, but which never
consumed more than seven or eight percent of its own defense production.” The case of
Romania was not quite different. On the other hand Yugoslavia as a leading country of the
third world produced and exported weapons, no less than its two neighbors. The common
question for these countries is whether the inherited defense industries can help for the
market adjustment of the national industries, and if that is possible what are the relevant
policies under the present political, institutional and market conditions.
The second group includes Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia.
Most of these countries are West Balkan countries. Due to their size or being components
of Yugoslavia, these countries did not develop significant defense industries. The countries
did not manage to develop adequate, separate and balanced national civil industry sectors,
either. The relevant question for these countries is whether and what size of a defense
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industry they need. It is possible that building their national defense industries will
stimulate the countries’ economic development.
Furthermore when analyzing the key policy issues, related to the SEEC defense industries
and their influence on the civil industrial sector of the countries, we will differentiate
between the two mentioned groups of countries.
Defense industry - restructuring and legislation, privatization, framework agreements,
strategic partnership
The political changes after the end of the Cold War produced dramatic changes in SEEC
defense industrial sectors. In answer to the sharp cuts in procurement budgets and intentions
to reduce forces (Zlatko Isakovich, p. 69, 1993), the production of weapons in the first
group of countries was reduced from 5 to 10 times. Many defense companies were
restructured or closed down. Hundred of the surviving factories have left the defense
industry. Hundreds of thousands defense workers lost their jobs. The countries inherited a
huge production overcapacity for the production of  “legacy” weapon systems that were
designed under the old operational requirements and are no more usable and efficient in the
new security environment
The defense production overcapacity is a real problem for the survival of the defense
companies in these countries. Unless this excess capacity is eliminated, the SEE countries
in transition and their governments will continue to suffer from production inefficiency and
eventually from additional expenditures for the salvaged state owned companies.
Adjusting the shape, and eliminating the overcapacity problem of the SEE defense
industries in the new political and business conditions is not only a marketing question. As
the defense industries in most of the countries worked under the oligopoly conditions, the
solution is in the fundamental change of the old policy to keep the out-of-date production
lines open, and the companies state owned.
There are many examples of political platforms and government efforts revealing their
inability to cope with the market adjustment and overcapacity problem. The inherited and
destroyed cooperation pattern left over from the COMECON, the excessive production
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concentration, the growing technological lagging behind, the impact of economic stagnation
concomitant with the market transformation, social tensions are only some of the reasons
for the delay of the restructuring and privatization of the industry. The issue at stake today
is whether the defense industries of the SEEC has the potential to survive in the changed
environment, whether the survival is necessary and justified and, if yes, to what extent and
what kind of defense industrial policy is capable of supporting the necessary survival.
Now we can admit that only a policy, which is capable of attracting enough foreign direct
investment in the defense industry, can help the countries to solve the overcapacity problem
and to support the national industrial bases. It is certain that restructuring, privatization;
restricting bribery and corruption are only the instruments for improving the investment
climate in the market. Attracting experienced strategic partners, which can transfer the
modern technologies into the defense industries is only one possible way for the defense
industry revitalization and the reconstruction of the first group of SEE countries’
economies.
The second group of countries have no overcapacity problems, but because of the lack of
experience they will be less interesting for the foreign investors. They have to guarantee
special relative advantages for those investors. It is doubtful that these countries can
develop special relative production opportunities for competitive defense outputs. The
scarcity of national resources will urge them to allocate these resources in more profitable
and socially important areas. Development of the maintenance and repair facilities is a
politically appropriate and economically stable step.
Defense industry - outsourcing from MoD, utilization of extra old equipment, offset
programs, subcontracting and life cycle support
Since the middle of the 90s Bulgaria and Romania have started a process of defense
reshaping and Army reduction. The objective has been to reduce their forces two times in 5
– 7 years period. They have been pursuing their plan in the beginning of the new century,
although with a slight delay. Starting from 109 thousand people Bulgaria’s army has been
reduced to about 60 thousand.  Related to the reshaping, decline in demand of weapons and
equipment is an additional factor, which further complicates the survival of the defense
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industries. For Bulgaria particularly the sector collapsed and the number of companies
shrank from 150 to 25. Five medium-sized enterprises only managed to survive. All
consisted traditionally of two parts: the first under the control of the Ministry of Industry
(and then Ministry of Economy), and the second under the Ministry of Defense; the
military-controlled parts were the better performers.
Starting the process of outsourcing MoD directed some activities and related offers mainly
to the TEREM enterprise (which consolidated 11 medium and small and one big factory),
dealing with repair works and defense equipment manufacturing. Terem did renovation
works for the old equipment that was given as a present to Macedonia in 1998 and launched
some life support activities for the existing equipment. In the end of 1999 MoD drastically
cut its own defense research capacity, redirected R&D activities outside. Some other
activities, such as construction works, trade, commissariat, and others have been
outsourced, too.
The companies from the first group have been privatized, except for the biggest four big not
due to their importance for the national security, but due to the complicated structure of the
companies. A “modus operandi” of these companies was to sell outside, and to convert their
production from defense to civilian use. Because of lack of capital and inadequate R&D
capacity this tactic was not successful.
Bulgaria’s defense industry cannot succeed to develop offset programs in spite of relatively
sufficient resources being allocated for the new communications equipment, helicopters,
and some other contracts. There are some publications that Romania is doing better than
Bulgaria in this respect.
Export control, licenses - short, mid and long term prospects, organizational dimension of
export control - full life cycle of the export cases and integration of the institutions
The necessity of applying the internationally accepted practices of export control of the
weapons and dual use goods and technologies is a key line in the sub-regional defense
industry policy. The radical change of the SEE governments arms export policies will help
not only to stabilize the defense industries, but also to remove the obstacles to economic
growth, arising from the regional insecurity. In this respect Bulgaria has learnt an important
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lesson. Gradually the country is changing its image from an indiscriminate  to a mindful
exporter.
After a long period of failures: “…there are promising signs of change in Bulgarian policy
and the actual flows of Bulgarian weapons to regions of conflict and countries of concern
have apparently been significantly curtailed in the last year and one half” (Curtis M.
Coward, p. 8, 2001).
The recent promising indications of the fundamental change in Bulgarian arms transfer
policy should not be a reason for self-complacency. The first SEE group of countries need a
sustainable policy for improving the export control legislation. No less important will be a
relevant industrial policy, which supports the companies’ efforts to convert, and expand
their production for civil use, or specialize and develop it within the common EU and
NATO – countries cooperative frame.
Technology implementation, technology superiority and technology security
The development of the SEE defense industries was based on the starting large-scale
industrialization of the countries. The production portfolio included non- sophisticated
items of weapons – mostly small arms, light weapons, rockets and ammunition. These are
the products, whose technological limit can be easily reached. They did not involve the use
of sophisticated materials, high complexity, and specialized electronic equipment. As a
member of the Warsaw Pact Bulgarian and Romanian industries produced the defense
products complied with Soviet license regime and standards. The modern and more
sophisticated equipment was manufactured with key components and elements imported
from the Soviet Union or produced in cooperation with the other Eastern countries.
The countries lack sufficient resources for extensive R&D and have not developed
sufficient R&D capacity, except in some narrow niches. The reduction of military budgets
and production dramatically shrank this capacity. The technological gap between leading
and SEE countries widened. The future development is possible only on the basis of
technological transfer from the leading Western countries. The key factor for the transfer
will be the regulation of such important issues as intellectual property and industrial
security. A relevant management will be obligatory, too.
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Business opportunities - defense industry, civil industry
The problem of how to increase productivity and support the civilian industrial sector has
not enjoyed a large priority. In the end of the 90s a more relevant question was how and
what size of the defense industry should be saved. It became obvious that the inherited
specialization and overcapacity have limited the national resources, available for economic
development.
The present political, institutional and market conditions are not favorable for the SEE
countries’ defense industries. The products are not attractive, prices are low, and the
markets have shrunk. Producers with mediocre and poor technological capabilities are
under high pressure. In the markets dominated by the buyers few companies can rely on the
government’s support. In many cases the expenditures for stabilizing and keeping the
production capacity are larger than the losses as a result of their liquidation.
To find an acceptable solution to the overcapacity crisis the governments saw to it that the
defense industry capacity of the individual countries meets current and future national
security requirements. It is also obligatory to know what the affordable shape of the defense
industry for the national economy is. A policy, which has no clear and exact answer to these
questions, is not relevant to the present situation. Such a policy does not reduce the
uncertainty for producers and increases their risks.
Role of the academic institutions for transition and building opportunities
The academic institutions of the SEE countries have to save and develop their capability
and competence for defense R&D activities. This conclusion arises from the accepted
policies for outsourcing. The success of the academicians is only possible if their countries
manage to arrange a large-scale exchange of teaching programs, students and teachers.
Cooperation in the sphere of studies will be also an important factor for the defense industry
adjustment. The ability of the individual country policy to identify the existing problems, to
allocate necessary resources, and to initiate promising cooperative studies is a good sign for
the existing defense industries.
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Role of business organizations and NGOs
In the short run the regional business organizations will find it difficult to keep, and develop
their capability for advanced defense R&D works. The political and administrative
orientation and support will be extremely important for establishing new cooperative
relations. Participation in NATO and EU international consolidation of the defense
industries is a key policy, which only can help the countries to meet their defense needs and
operational requirements. Such policy can open the doors for development of needed
intergovernmental agreements with the strategic country and company partners. The
governments have to initiate the liquidation of the large stockpiles of arms and
ammunitions. It will give to the companies not only additional contracts, but clear
understanding of the future operational needs of the military forces.
NGOs have a special place and can play an important role for the defense industry
adjustment. These organizations can (and have done so before) reinforce the efforts of the
governments, and other state bodies for selecting and applying the relevant policies. They
can make the needed interaction between the government, defense industry businesses and
citizens of the country. A clear and immediate reaction to the key political decisions and
administrative actions could be a good help to the governments. The openness and
transparency of the national defense policy is a precondition for that help, both within the
countries and between them.
Role of MoD in restructuring and management of the defense sector - National Armaments
Director, and Policy Directorate, Defense Planning (Mobilization Readiness) Directorate,
Acquisition and Logistics Agencies, Advanced Defense Research Institutes
As a leading government institution, responsible for the defense policy and military
capability of the country, MoD has to organize the necessary national bodies for the
implementation of the national defense strategy and policy. The key role has to be played by
the National Armament Directorates, Defense Planning Directorate, and Acquisition and
Logistic Agencies. National Armament Directorates need to translate a political strategies
into a clear operational requirements and product specifications. They are responsible for
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the initiation of important R&D and supply projects and their implementation into practice,
developing cooperation with the Conference of Armament Directors in the PfP format.
Defense Planning (Mobilization Preparedness) Directorates need to allocate the available
defense resources between the competitive alternatives for reaching the required operational
capability in time of peace and crises.
Acquisition and Logistic Agencies should be requested to contact NATO Maintenance and
Supply Agency (NAMSA) promoting national capabilities for production, and offering
ammunitions, maintenance and repair works.
Future of the defense industrial internationalization and consolidation - gate to European
and US defense industry integration.
The following important steps should be undertaken for supporting and facilitating the entry
of the SEE countries in legitimate western markets:
Defense companies should consider establishing national and sub-regional trade
associations that could promote the countries’ advantages.
The MoD Directorates should seek specific instruments to stimulate competence, and to
support development of subcontract works for the national companies.
The governments should improve the national contract legislation and  encourage the
leading western prime contractors to take part in the competitive procurement contracts.
The governments have to elaborate clear strategies, including broader policy objectives for
market revitalization or converting the defense industries. They should launch special
programs to promote incentives for direct foreign investments, and thus  stimulates
national economic development.
* * *
It is obvious that even the SEE countries’ defense industries are becoming increasingly
“globalized”. No single defense industry company is capable to offer modern end products,
without using components from other firms, located outside national boundaries. The
possible solution is to start dynamic processes of large national (in short run), and sub-
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regional (middle-term) restructuring of the defense industries. This process could stimulate
national and sub-regional defense industries’ integration with the enlarging European and
Euro-Atlantic defense industry base.
The Bulgarian government started such a process of national consolidation through the state
company TEREM’s mediation. By offering entire military plants or part of them for
privatization MoD is trying to attract foreign private investors and to join the national
industry with the EU and NATO countries’ industries.
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Conclusions
This study is to find the rationale in the economic area for the future membership of
Bulgaria and the SEE countries in NATO. It is proved that the formula “Investment in
Security for Security of Investments” is applicable really, because of the very close relation
between SEE security and economic environments. This is proven not only in the area of
infrastructure, because of the link with key regions such as the Middle East, the
Mediterranean, the Caucasus and Central Asia for Europe and the US and not only for the
classic infrastructure such as transport, communications, energy, information, but even for
cultural exchange, knowledge-based industry and solving the problem of continuity -
physical and cultural.
“Infrastructure” is not only with a positive sign, there is infrastructure for trafficking
corridors (weapons, drugs/narcotics, people, etc.) and stopping them is crucial for economy.
There are at least three to four positive processes in SEE - NATO enlargement, EU
enlargement, regional cooperation and Stability Pact. All of them have certain price, but can
bring a lot of benefits - depending on the strategic vision, will and management. In this
sense the Marshall Plan for Europe can be a good example. Accession to NATO of Poland,
the Czech Republic and Hungary can be a good example as well. Joining a security and
defense alliance is a key to economic cooperation and NATO structure of committees and
agencies is another example.
So NATO membership has global and geopolitical implications for economy, but there are
some direct implications as well - connected with the utilization, modernization and re-
equipment of the armed forces and security sector elements as well as a policy of
outsourcing, dual use infrastructure, alliance funded projects, basic ordering agreements,
joint projects and joint ventures, R&D cooperation and exchange of technologies (NATO
Science Committee, NATO Research and Technology Organization, etc.)
58
A key role in modernization is played by the C4ISR systems and project, but the issue of
platforms - short, mid- and long-term solutions, their integration is a large area for business
to find new opportunities. R&D and cooperation with the academic sector as well as
organizational arrangements in the area of modernization (acquisition process, smart
procurement, joint procurement) are potential tools to define a better and more transparent
way of estimating the scope of modernization funding for the next 20 years, that is to
support business planing and strategic partnership in the defense industry and larger civil
industry sector.
A clear, modern and internationally certified approach to modernization gives opportunity
to the defense industry to be better restructured in a proper legislative framework to pursue
successful privatization, framework agreements and strategic partnership.
Outsourcing from MoD, utilization of extra old equipment, offset programs, subcontracting
and life cycle support are new, though beneficial areas of involvement for the defense and
civil sector companies.
NATO membership will lend a new perspective to export control, licenses policy, post
shipment control and full life cycle support of the export cases with integration of the
institutions even on international level. Issues of security and exchange of information are
to be solved in a different environment. The new policy of technology implementation,
technology superiority and technology security is to foster competitiveness of our industry
if new business opportunities are aggressively and professionally pursued.
A new role is assigned to the academic institutions for transition and opportunities building
as well as a special place for the business organizations and NGOs, which have to be
prepared to work in a new environment.
The short study that is presented in this report is to emphasize some important conclusions:
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Strong link between security and economic development as it was proven in Central
Europe, and may be an even stronger link in SEE, having in mind regions of
proximity such as the Middle East, the Mediterranean; the Caucasus, Central Asia.
Special importance of infrastructure, its security and control, keeping in mind the
terror attacks in the US;
Opportunity for synergy among NATO, EU integration, the Stability Pact, regional
cooperation and transatlantic link with US and Canada if using the good example of
the Marshall Plan - mainly a strategic vision, will and good management with more
local involvement;
Essential role of the reforms (not only in the armed forces, but in the security sector
as a whole - with deeper involvement of the President, the government, Parliament
and society) to join NATO and, what is more, to enjoy the benefits of membership;
Influence of the defense and security sector reform on the defense industry and even
the civil industry sector restructuring through long-term utilization, modernization,
re-equipment and outsourcing plans. Core importance of the C4ISR programs as the
main interoperability and integration factor and setting up of an environment for
platform modernization;
Importance of the organizational and legislative (including acquisition, export
control, defense industry, etc.) arrangements for successful modernization programs
and transparent competitive participation of the local and international companies as
well as for offset programs and building strategic partnerships;
Crucial role of the common or at least coordinated research and development,
testbeds utilization, certification, standardization, education and training in the
implementation of the reform and modernization of the security sector;
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Importance of the business organizations (CEOs of the companies in different
sectors) and NGOs in achieving high effectiveness and efficiency in NATO
integration.
The main conclusion is to stress that in order to use the long list of potential and already
existing benefits from future Bulgarian membership in NATO as well as larger NATO
enlargement into SEE, it is important to introduce many changes in the business sector,
defense/security establishment, academic and NGO sector, investments. The contribution of
all these partners to NATO membership will produce high return to all of them, so a
coordinated Action Plan is needed. The Employers Association of Bulgaria which initiated
this report is the first, but very important step in this direction. It gives a really new
dimension to the Bulgarian readiness to join NATO and proves that this is not only military
or political issue, but a business one as well.
There are two US organizations – the Atlantic Council and the Business Executives for
National Security (BENS) that already did some research in the area of our defense industry
and NATO readiness, currently a Force Modernization Study (FMS) is underway in the
Armed Forces; in the C4ISR area key projects are already launched - NMCC, ASOC,
NAVAIDS, FICIS, VTMS (MSOC) and CIO institution with Manual of Life Cycle
Management of the C4ISR systems are “operational”. In 6-8 months such arrangements will
be accomplished in the platforms area, maintenance and other services, NATO logistic
support operations are already routine on our territory, NATO exercises too, so there are
broad vistas for more intensive cooperation. “Hemus 2002” exhibition is coming in
May’2002 and hopefully by that time the Long-term Modernization Plan of the armed
forces will be approved by Parliament. It is high time Bulgarian business becomes more
proactive (as with this paper) in shaping the economic environment vis a vis NATO
membership and to have National Security Advisory Board of Business Executives that will
really strengthen our position as a future NATO member.
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The Employers Association of Bulgaria (EABG) is the umbrella organization of the major
Bulgarian private companies with more than 100 employees. At present the members of the
EABG are 70 (holding groups and individual companies) and their combined turnover
exceeds USD 2  billion. Together they employ more than 120 000 people. They cover a
wide range of sectors of the Bulgarian industry. The Association represents the interests of
industry in all economic policy matters towards parliament and government, the political
parties and leading social groups.
The Association provides services for our member companies and acts as a speaker for
them in their external relations.
The Association was inaugurated on April 24, 2000 in the presence of H.E. Petar Stoyanov,
President of the Republic of Bulgaria and members of the government. The main aims of
the Association are:
- to protect of the interests of the employers
- to strengthen the Bulgarian economy and improve its global competitiveness
- to promote  Bulgarian exports worldwide
- to create a favourable taxation and investment environment
- to assist the maintenance  of  a reliable and safe trade
- to encourage  economic cooperation with foreign organizations and partners
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CENTRE FOR LIBERAL STRATEGIES
The Centre for Liberal Strategies is an independent, non-profit public policy institute. It was
registered in 1994 with Sofia Municipal Court, and acquired its present operative form in
mid-1995. CLS team combine strong academic background with various forms of direct
involvement in the political process, civil society, and governmental institutions.
The guiding rationale of CLS is that in the present East-Central European context, a think-
tank is the most appropriate instrument to:
• promote open public debate
• influence the decision-making process
• serve as a tool for resolving social crises.
 
 The CLS provides expertise in the following major areas:
• Politics, political parties, electoral process
• Foreign and integration policy
• Security policy
• Constitutional policy and state institutions
• Macroeconomic analysis, economic history
The CLS develops and implements projects addressing various aspects of the social,
economic and political situation in Bulgaria. It organizes workshops, conferences, and
seminars with local and foreign experts, politicians and public figures.
More information about the Centre for Liberal Strategies is available on
http://www.cls-sofia.org
